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Abstract 
The present paper aims to shed some light on tourist firms’ incentives to engage in 
corporate social responsibility activities in an imperfectly competitive environment. 
The focus on CSR in the tourism sector has emerged due to the existence of a critical 
mass of consumers’ willingness to pay a premium for such initiatives. A problem 
however emerges in the production of corporate social responsibility activities from 
the supply side. This is because entrepreneurs exhibit a strong free riding behaviour in 
their provision. The theoretical results illustrate that the existence of voluntary 
certification schemes would provide firms a more efficient framework to undertake 
CSR efforts. 
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The present paper aims to develop a theoretical model in order to examine tourist 
firms’ economic incentives to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility activities. 
Corporate social responsibility can be defined as “a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Commission, 
2001). According to Frey and George (2010), corporate social responsibility efforts 
may include a wide range of activities in line with the stakeholders’ interests. 
Corporate social responsibility activities of this type are difficult - if not impossible - 
to be inferred by consumers, through search or consumption. In this context, the paper 
argues that the socially responsible attributes attached to the tourism product, through 
firms' corporate social responsibility activities, are classified as credence good (Auriol 
and Schillizzi, 2003).  
 
The vast majority of theoretical models in the field focus mainly on the environmental 
impact minimization aspects of corporate social responsibility (Blanco et al., 2009). In 
fact the majority of the literature demonstrates that tourist entrepreneurs would have a 
strong incentive to under invest in voluntary environmental upgrading actions (see for 
instance, Calveras and Vera-Hernandez, 2005; Candela and Cellini, 2006; Pintassilgo 
and Albino, 2007). The main reason for this is free riding behavior. Yet, corporate 
social responsibility by definition encompasses a much broader set of activities. 
Ostrom (1990) formalizes Hardins’s (1968) model on the “tragedy of the commons” 
in a game theoretic context. His main finding is that in equilibrium, due to the 
prisoner’s dilemma predicament, no firm has an incentive to engage in costly actions 
that can improve the environment. Blanco et al. (2009) extended Ostrom’s (1990) 
model. They found that under full information disclosure conditions regarding 
voluntary environmental activities, and assuming asymmetric firms regarding the cost 
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of CSR for certain parametrical values, there exist a number of asymmetric equilibria 
in which a firm can engage in CSR actions.  
 
1.1 Research questions  
The present paper focuses on firms’ incentives to engage in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR henceforth) activities in an imperfectly competitive environment, 
where strategic interactions between competing firms may arise. More specifically we 
attempt to address the following questions: 
 First, what are the main factors that influence tourist firms’ decisions to 
strategically engage in CSR activities?  
 Second, what are the policy measures that must be implemented in order to 
enhance CSR activities by firms?  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section deals with the 
theoretical background of the model. Section 3 considers the role of the information 
disclosure mechanism. Section 4 discusses some policy implications, while section 5 
concludes the discussion. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section we propose a theoretical model to demonstrate the factors that 
influence firm decisions regarding CSR activities. More specifically, the paper 
extends the theoretical model proposed by Blanco et al. (2009) by relaxing three 
important assumptions.  
 
First, we introduce consumers’ heterogeneity regarding CSR activities. We assume 
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that consumers differ regarding their social-environmental consciousness and 
therefore their willingness to pay for such initiatives (Moutinho, 2000; Poon, 1994; 
Dodds and Joppe, 2005 and PATA, 2007. More specifically, we assume that 
consumers are homogeneous towards the physical characteristics of the touristic 
product (they all enjoy the same levels of utility by visiting the same destination) but 
heterogeneous towards CSR activities connected to the destination (a socially 
conscious consumer will exhibit a higher willingness to pay for accommodation 
services provided by CSR oriented firms).  
 
Second, following Porter and Kramer (2006) and Bottega and De Freitas (2009), we 
treat CSR as a credence good. More particularly, we assume (the existence of) 
information asymmetries in the consumption and production stages of the tourist 
product/service. Thus, consumers cannot identify CSR related production approaches, 
even post – consumption (Frey and George 2010). In this context this paper argues 
that the socially responsible attributes attached to the tourism product, through firms' 
CSR activities, are classified as credence good (Auriol and Schillizzi, 2003). Hence, 
socially conscious consumers may not be in a position to distinguish which firms are 
truly engaging in CSR activities without a credible information disclosure mechanism 
(CIDM henceforth). The credence aspect of CSR activities generates a moral hazard 
problem. Once consumers have been convinced that a firm has undertaken CSR 
efforts, the firm has an incentive to renege on this promise and avoid any spending on 
costly CSR activities (Besley and Ghatak, 2007). 
 
Third, based on empirical results from Goodman (2000) and Rivera (2002) we assume 
that socially conscious consumers are only willing to pay a price premium to firms 
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that are connected to CSR activities. Therefore, under the existence of perfect 
information about firms’ social responsibility initiatives, consumers will not be 
willing to pay a price premium to firms that are not connected to CSR activities. As a 
consequence, and in contrast to Blanco et al. (2009), we argue that there cannot be 
any free ride markup pricing by firms that have not engaged in CSR activities.  
 
Given the above analysis, on the demand side, we assume that there is a unit mass of 
consumers. A fraction 0 1a≤ ≤  of more socially conscious consumers are willing to 
pay a higher price for the tourist product connected to CSR initiatives. Similarly, a 
fraction (1-a) of consumers are not willing to pay a premium price for CSR related 
touristic firms. On the supply side, we assume for simplicity that we have N firms 
offering the same quality of tourism services in the same destination. Indicatively, this 
assumption could be taken to imply that all tourist firms offer hospitality services at 
the same destination.  
 
Following Blanco et al (2009), the price in which firm i sells its product is given by: 
i ip A k= +  (1) 
Where ip  is the overall price charged to consumers, A is the part of price that is not 
connected to CSR activity and, ik is the premium on price to the firm believed by the 
consumers to engage into CSR activities. Here, we assume that socially conscious 
consumers will only increase their willingness to pay for the product of the firm that 
engages in CSR. Due to the credence attribute of CSR, we also incorporate all the 
positive demand effects from CSR activities to the parameter ik to including the 
benefit to the firms that free ride on other firms’ CSR activities. This assumption does 
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not change the results qualitatively, since the benefits from free riding are measured 
separately as in Blanco et al. (2009). Yet, the possibility that firms engaging in CSR 
and still free ride is also incorporated in our model. 
Hence, the profit function of firm i is given by: 
( ) , 0 1,
(1 ) , 0 1,
i i i A i
i
i A
aq A k c c F for a if the firmundertakes CSR
a q A c for a if the firm does not undertake CSR
π
+ − − − ≤ ≤




Where, ,i ic F  are the corresponding values of the variable and fixed costs related to 
costly environmental action, and Ac the cost of the firm that is not connected to CSR. 
iq is the quantity sold by firm i. Equation (2) formalizes the idea that CSR has two 
opposite effects on profits. More specifically, engaging in CSR activities may 
increase the willingness to pay for the group of consumers that are socially conscious. 
On the other hand, engaging in CSR activities may include actions that increase the 
variable costs of the firm, such as using environmentally friendly inputs, or pay fair 
wages to employees. Moreover, it may include fixed costs such as green investments 
that reduce pollution (Frey and George, 2010).  
 
3. THE ROLE OF THE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE MECHANISM  
3.1 Strategic incentives for CSR without a CIDM. 
In this section we demonstrate firms’ incentives to undertake CSR initiatives given 
the context described above. We assume that there is no CIDM regarding firms’ CSR 
activities. Therefore we allow for the possibility that some firms will choose to 
pretend CSR orientation and therefore free ride on other firms’ CSR efforts. However, 
given that the final outcome is obvious to consumers,, if no firm has engaged in CSR, 
then there is no positive contribution on the common pool resource and therefore 
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there is no possibility for free riding. 
 
Therefore a firm’s strategy space contains the following choices: First, to engage in 
CSR activities, by undertaking the corresponding costs and aiming to capture the 
positive demand effects through the price premium that socially conscious consumers 
are willing to pay. Second, not to undertake any environmentally friendly activities 
and aim to the residual demand from the group of consumers that are not willing to 
pay a premium for tourist products connected to CSR activities. If the firm opts for 
the second strategy, due to the credence attribute of CSR activities and the existence 
of information asymmetries between firms and consumers, it can then also choose to 
free ride on other firms’ CSR activities. That is, not to undertake any costs related to 
CSR activity, but claim to do so, in order to benefit from the price premium. 
 
Following Blanco et al. (2009) we assume that each firm produces one unit of output 
(qi=1) and A, Ac are common to all firms since the product is homogeneous. 
Moreover, for simplicity, we reduce the number of players to two. Given the outcome 








Table 1: Payoff matrix without a CIDM. 
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CSR 1 1 1 1( ) Aa A k c c Fπ = + − − −
 
2 2 2 2( ) Aa A k c c Fπ = + − − −
 
1 1 1 1( ) Aa A k c c Fπ = + − − −
 
2 2( ) Aa A k cπ = + −  or 2 (1 ) Aa A cπ = − −   
NO 1 1( ) Aa A k cπ = + −  or 1 (1 ) Aa A cπ = − −  
2 2 2 2( ) Aa A k c c Fπ = + − − −
 
1 1( ) Aa A k cπ = + −  or 1 (1 ) Aa A cπ = − −  
2 2( ) Aa A k cπ = + −  or 2 (1 ) Aa A cπ = − −  
 
By illustrating the Nash equilibrium conditions in this game, the following 
observations are in order: 
Since, ( ) ( )i i i ia A k c F a A k+ − − ≤ + for all , 0, 1, 2A ic F i≥ = , then engaging in CSR is 
strictly dominated strategy for each firm, since profits from undertaking costly CSR 
activities are always lower as compared to the profits arising from free riding. Hence, 
this result implies that in equilibrium, firms would never choose to engage in CSR 
activities. This is because costs associated with CSR compliance outweigh any 
possible benefits.  
 
Now firms have to choose between pretending to be CSR oriented and avoid 
undertaking any of the costs associated with CSR activities, or not engaging in CSR at 
all. By taking in to consideration the time consistency of the game, the only possible 
outcome is that no firm will actually engage in CSR. Assuming that the price 
premium is high enough, both firms will have a strong incentive to pretend to be CSR 
oriented in order to benefit from the price premium and then avoid undertaking any of 
the costs associated with CSR activities. The equilibrium outcome in this case 
actually corresponds to Akerlof’s (1970) “Market for Lemons” problem. More 
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specifically, consumers rationally believe that firms have undertaken no CSR 
activities and the market for CSR collapses, since, given their anticipations, the 
fraction of consumers that are willing to pay for a price premium related to firms’ 
CSR activities is reduced to zero. Therefore, both firms will choose not to engage in 
CSR at all. The rationale behind this result lies on the absence of a credible 
information path that would allow firms not connected to CSR to benefit from the 
positive demand effects associated with CSR activities.   
 
Hence, in contrast to Blanco et al. (2009), we find that due to the existence of 
asymmetric information there are no incentives for firms to engage in CSR activities. 
This is in line with the prisoner’s dilemma situation presented by Ostrom (1990). Note 
that we do not exclude the possibility of firms deciding or even pretending to engage 
in CSR, or asymmetric equilibria in which one firm decides not to pretend to be CSR 
oriented, while the rival does. This will depend on factors that will be analyzed in the 
next subsection.  
 
3.2 Strategic incentives for CSR with a CIDM. 
Let us now assume that there is a CIDM through which firms communicate their CSR 
activities. This mechanism could be a certification body run by firms or the local 
authorities. Following Bottega and De Freitas (2009), we make the additional 
assumption that monitoring is almost perfect, i.e., the probability that the certifier 
identifies the cheating firm is almost one. This means that consumers that observe the 
CSR certification of a product are aware that the certified firm is socially responsible 
and complies with imposed standards. Hence, due to certification there is no 
possibility that firms can free ride on other firms’ CSR actions. Therefore, firms’ 
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strategic options are now reduced to the following choices: engage in CSR activities, 
or not. Given the outcome of each firm’s strategy we obtain the following table: 
 
Table 2: Payoff matrix with a CIDM. 






CSR 1 1 1 1( ) Aa A k c c Fπ = + − − −
 
2 2 2 2( ) Aa A k c c Fπ = + − − −
 
 
1 1 1 1( ) Aa A k c c Fπ = + − − −  
2 (1 ) Aa A cπ = − −
 
NO 1 (1 ) Aa A cπ = − −  
2 2 2 2( ) Aa A k c c Fπ = + − − −  
1 (1 ) Aa A cπ = − −
 




By considering the above, each firm would engage in CSR only if the corresponding 
profits are higher than not engaging in CSR activities. Therefore, the following 
condition must hold: 
( ) (1 ) , 1, 2i i ia A k c F a A i+ − − > − =  (3) 
From (3), the following observations are in order: The group of consumers that are 
socially conscious (a) and therefore exhibit a higher willingness to pay for the tourist 
product connected to CSR, is positively related to firms’ profits from CSR activities. 
This means that these consumers are also positively associated with the firm’s 
incentives to engage in CSR. The level of the mark up on the price that firms can 
charge because of their CSR activities also increases the profits associated with CSR. 
Consequently, the motivation to engage in CSR activities increases accordingly. 
However, the higher the corresponding cost of CSR activities, the lower the firm’s 
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incentive to engage in CSR activities. 
 
Due to the elimination of information asymmetries and the existence of a CIDM, it is 
possible to obtain equilibria in which both firms will choose to engage in CSR 
activities. This will allow firms to realize possible benefits from CSR due to positive 
demand effects from socially conscious consumers. However, such equilibria will 
only emerge if there is a critical mass of consumers that are willing to pay a relatively 
high mark up on price for such activities in order to compensate firms for the 
corresponding costs. Of course asymmetric solutions, in which one firm actually 
engages in CSR actions while the other is not, cannot be excluded as a possible 
equilibrium. Assuming asymmetry of operational costs and the investments needed in 
order to engage in CSR activities, it is most possible that firms that actually are in a 
position to undertake CSR are those with lower operational costs (Khanna 2001).  
 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The results above give rise to some interesting policy implications. Since by 
definition CSR is taken to imply engagement in environmental and social activities 
above the requirements of the law, there is no room for command and control 
measures. However, there is a portfolio of policy instruments that can still be used to 
enhance firms’ environmental and social over compliance.  
 
First, practitioners should create or support a CIDM regarding CSR. Voluntary 
certification schemes for instance can impose certain CSR standards that firms must 
comply with in order to be certified as socially and environmentally friendly. The 
scheme above could communicate the information to socially and environmentally 
conscious consumers and therefore could trigger the positive demand effects on firms’ 
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CSR related products. Furthermore, voluntary certification schemes could prevent any 
future attempts for free riding behaviour by firms that do not comply with the 
standards. Voluntary certification standards such as ISO 26000 are examples of 
realization of the above analysis. This measure is in line with the empirical evidence 
by Rivera (2002, 2004) on Costa Rican Certification scheme for Sustainable Tourism. 
 
Second, the authorities should also support activities that would reduce the cost of the 
investment associated with CSR actions. Such examples could be collective solutions 
such as tourism collaborations and partnerships for sustainability (see for instance 
WTO, 2001, 2002). Joint CSR investments could create economies of scale at an 
individual firm level. Moreover, the exchange of knowledge between firms on CSR 
related strategies could help them implement more efficient managerial practices in 
order to achieve effective environmental and/or social levels. 
 
Furthermore, common expenditure in communicating such activities may increase 
consumers’ social consciousness. Correspondingly, such an activity could generate 
positive effects on firms’ demand levels by increasing the relative size of the socially 
conscious consumers in the market. While it is true that in most industries firms try to 
communicate their CSR activities through advertising and publishing CSR reports, yet 
these are not always considered trustworthy by the consumers (Tsoutsoura, 2004; 
Porter and Kramer, 2002). Therefore, communicating CSR activities to consumers 
through an independent third body such as collective organizations or certification 
organizations could potentially reduce the cost of advertising by individual firms and 
provide a more trustworthy source of information to consumers. Potentially, this is an 
area that governments could become more active by evaluating and testing the 
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relevance, accuracy and truthfulness of the relative message reaching the consumer.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have developed a theoretical model to examine tourist firms’ 
economic incentives to engage in costly CSR activities. Our main findings contribute 
to the debate by Blanco et al. (2009) on tourist firms’ strategic incentives to engage in 
CSR. We find that under the existence of information asymmetries regarding CSR 
activities, firms do not have an incentive to engage in CSR. However, if a credible 
information disclosure mechanism exists that communicates to consumers all the 
necessary information about firms’ CSR activities, then it is possible that firms would 
have an incentive to engage in such actions.  
 
In this case, the factors that influence firms’ decision would be the size of the group 
of socially conscious consumers, the level of the price premium that firms can charge 
to CSR conscious consumers, and the costs underlying CSR activities. In this 
direction the paper makes recommendations on a set of managerial practices that 
would enhance firms’ incentives to engage in CSR, such as certification of CSR 
activities by tourism firms, and initiatives that would provide tourism firms a more 
efficient framework to undertake CSR efforts. 
 
Our findings also provide guidelines for future empirical work in examining the 
effects of tourist firms' CSR activities on their market performance. First, do CSR 
certified firms perform better as compared to those that are not? Second, what kind of 
certification mechanism (facilitating information disclosure) leads to higher price 
premium? This is an important question that has direct implications to the 
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management of these schemes. Last but not least, future empirical work should 
examine consumers’ preferences for future or hypothetical policy initiatives related to 
certification schemes. This is an equally significant task because it could inform 
managerial and practitioner decision making based on the examination of consumers’ 
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